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An Overview of the Fannie and Freddie Conservatorship Litigation
David Reiss*
The fate of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are subject to the vagaries of politics,
regulation, public opinion, the economy, and not least of all the numerous cases that have
been filed in 2013 against various government entities arising from the placement of the
two companies into conservatorship. This short article will provide an overview of the
last of these. The litigation surrounding Fannie and Freddie’s conservatorship raises all
sorts of issues about the federal government’s involvement in housing finance. These
issues are worth setting forth as the proper role of these two companies in the housing
finance system is still very much up in the air. The plaintiffs, in the main, argue that the
federal government has breached its duties to preferred shareholders, common
shareholders, and potential beneficiaries of a housing trust fund authorized by the same
statute that authorized their conservatorships. At this early stage, it appears that the
plaintiffs have a tough row to hoe. 1
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s main business is to provide credit guarantees for
residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”). They are behemoths of the housing
finance sector, owning or guaranteeing a combined forty seven percent of all the
residential mortgages in the United States. 2 This amounts to over 5.3 trillion dollars in
mortgages. 3 Fannie and Freddie are Government-Sponsored Enterprises (“GSEs”),
neither government agencies nor fully-private corporations. Historically, they have been
owned by private shareholders but were chartered by the federal government. As a result
of their hybrid nature, the government granted them all sorts of privileges, rights, and
exemptions. I have exhaustively reviewed these privileges in an earlier article, but let me
note one privilege at the outset. 4 As a general rule, banks are barred from owning equity
in for-profit corporations because they are considered to be overly risky investments. But
12 U.S.C. section 1464(c)(1)(E) allows federal savings and loans to buy Freddie Mac
preferred stock. 5 The implication of this exception is that this GSE preferred stock is a
safe investment for a conservative investor. 6 In other words, Congress has carved out an
exception to the conservative rule it had regarding investments for federal savings and
loans because of Freddie’s special relationship with the federal government. This

* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to Orly Graber for superb research assistance.
1
This article was drafted after the complaints in the cases discussed below were filed, but before the parties began filing any
additional papers in these cases, other than some purely procedural ones.
2
See FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY (FHFA), ENTERPRISE SHARE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE DEBT OUTSTANDING: 1990–
2010 [hereinafter FHFA CHART], available at http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=70 (showing outstanding mortgage debt
through the end of 2010) (last visited Feb. 19. 2014). Fannie Mae is formally known as the “Federal National Mortgage Association”
and Freddie Mac is formally known as the “Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation,” but they are universally referred to (even by
themselves) by their nicknames.
3
See FHFA CHART, supra note 2.
4
See generally David Reiss, The Federal Government’s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Obligations: Uncle
Sam Will Pick up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019 (2008).
5
Preferred stock receives dividends and/or liquidation distributions before, or in preference to, common shareholders.
6
The Treasury’s Office of Financial Research found that “[a]lthough equity securities are generally not permissible investments for
depository institutions, regulators allowed banks to hold shares of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because of the perceived special status
of the government-sponsored enterprises and the assumption of a government guarantee. Losses on those securities during the crisis
played a role in an estimated 15 U.S. bank failures and two distressed mergers.” OFFICE OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, ANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS, 41 (2013).
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preferred stock has taken on great significance in much of the post-conservatorship
litigation.
For most of their existence, Fannie and Freddie have been consistently and highly
profitable. But, foreshadowing the 2008 financial crisis, the two companies began
posting billions of dollars of losses in 2007. The losses jumped exponentially in 2008 to
combined losses that well exceeded $100 billion. 7 Losses in 2009 approached $100
billion again and then moderated to the low tens of billions in 2010 and 2011. 8 At the
same time, the United States Treasury was pumping billions of dollars into the two
companies. The last of these draws was in the final quarter of 2011, which was the last
time the companies saw losses. By the second quarter of 2012, the two companies saw a
marked improvement in their financial performance. Indeed, Fannie had record profits of
over $17 billion in 2012 and Freddie recorded nearly $11 billion in the same year. 9 The
likely fate of the two companies seems to change along with their financial condition, as
proposals for them range from nationalization to liquidation to privatization. 10
In this article, I will provide some background about Fannie and Freddie’s
regulatory environment. I will then review the events at the heart of the cases that were
filed in 2013 arising from their placement in conservatorship. These events include those
leading up to their entering conservatorship as well as those that occurred during their
conservatorship. I will provide an overview of the claims that were made in cases filed
relating to those events and highlight some of their important features. Because these
cases are at such an early stage, I will not go so far as to predict their outcomes or their
ultimate impact on the federal housing finance system more generally. But I will offer
some thoughts about how the federal government should be held accountable for its
actions in the midst of a financial crisis and in its aftermath.
I. Fannie and Freddie in Conservatorship
I have reviewed the events leading up to Fannie and Freddie’s conservatorship in
an earlier article, but some of those events bear repeating. 11 After the two companies
posted billions of dollars of quarterly losses beginning in 2007, their troubles were
reflected in their sinking stock prices. 12 Congress enacted the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA” or “the Act”) in order to bail them out. 13 Soon after
HERA was enacted, the federal government placed the GSEs in conservatorship,
pursuant to the Act. 14 The federal government made it clear that debt-holders would be
made whole, but it gave no similar signal to shareholders. 15
7

See N. Eric Weiss, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42760, Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s Financial Status: Frequently Asked
Questions (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42760.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
See N. Eric Weiss, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42760, Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s Financial Status: Frequently Asked
Questions (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42760.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
9
See N. Eric Weiss, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42760, Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s Financial Status: Frequently Asked
Questions (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42760.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
10
See, e.g., David Reiss, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Future of Federal Housing Finance Policy: A Study of Regulatory
Privilege, 61 ALA. L. REV. 907 (2010) (outlining various proposals).
11
Id.
12
See id. at 915.
13
See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008).
14
See infra Part I (reviewing events leading up to Fannie and Freddie entering conservatorship).
15
See James R. Hagerty, S&P Cuts Some Ratings on Fannie and Freddie, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2008, at C5 (noting that there is much
uncertainty as to whether the federal government would protect holders of preferred stock and subordinated debt even if they were to
back the companies’ senior debt).
8
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HERA provided a new regulatory regime for Fannie and Freddie. Most
importantly for this article, it provided a roadmap to deal with insolvency by either or
both companies. The relevant provisions of the Act for the purposes of this article are
those that deal with (1) Fannie and Freddie’s financial safety and soundness regulation;
(2) government support for the two companies during the financial crisis; and (3) the
creation of an affordable housing trust fund.
Safety and Soundness. The Act created a new regulator for the two companies,
the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“the Agency” or “FHFA”). 16 The Agency is run
by a Director appointed by the President. 17 The Act identifies the actions that can be
taken if either or both Fannie and Freddie become undercapitalized. 18 Most relevant
here, a critically undercapitalized entity may have the Agency named as conservator or
receiver. 19 HERA gives the Director the authority to appoint the FHFA as conservator or
receiver for the regulated entity. 20 HERA states that the FHFA shall, “as a conservator or
receiver, . . . succeed to . . . all rights, titles, powers and privileges of . . . any
stockholder” of Fannie and Freddie. 21 The Act also states that except “at the request of
[the FHFA], no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or
functions of [the FHFA] as conservator or receiver.” 22
Conservatorship and receivership are typically seen as being quite similar, although
conservatorship is distinct from the status of receivership. A conservatorship is generally
preferred where the entity is expected to return to sound and solvent condition at some
point in the future. 23 Under section 1145 of HERA, as conservator of the Entities, the
Agency may “take such action as may be — (i) necessary to put the regulated entity in a
sound and solvent condition, and (ii) appropriate to carry on the business of the regulated
entity and preserve and conserve the assets and property of the regulated entity.” 24As
conservator, the FHFA has the legal authority to enter into and nullify contracts on behalf
of the companies while under conservatorship. Under this authority, FHFA entered into
Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (PSPAs) with the Treasury. The companies are
bound by these agreements. In the case of Fannie, the Treasury’s authority to enter into
the PSPA stems from section 304(g) of the Federal National Mortgage Association
Charter Act, under which Congress created Fannie Mae for the purpose of establishing
secondary mortgage market facilities for residential mortgages. 25
Receivership, pursuant to the Act, would have the FHFA “place the regulated
entity in liquidation and proceed to realize upon the assets of the regulated entity,”
essentially winding the entity down. 26 The FHFA can place the companies into
receivership if the Director makes a determination that for a period of 60 days: (1) their
16

See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, supra note 9, § 1101. FHFA replaced the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight, a weak regulator. See Reiss, supra note 6, at 920.
17
See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, supra note 9, § 1312.
18.
See id. §§ 1143–45.
19.
See id. § 1145.
20.
See id. § 1147.
21
12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(A)(i) (2008).
22
Id. § 4617(f).
23
See, e.g., FDIC, RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK 70–71 (2003), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/index.html
(last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
24
12 U.S.C. § 4617(b).
25
See Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1716 (2008), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/GetFile.aspx?FileID=29 (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
26
Id. § 4617(b)(2)(E).
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assets are less than their obligations (a net worth deficit), or (2) if they have not been
paying their debts. 27 Additionally, the Director can place the Entities into receivership
“at his discretion at any time for other reasons including conditions that FHFA has
already asserted existed at the time the Director of FHFA placed [the companies] into
conservatorship.” 28 Notwithstanding the overlap in roles between the FHFA as
conservator and as receiver, one might say that the former focuses on ongoing operations
and the latter on liquidation.
Government Support. HERA also authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to
make unlimited equity and debt investments in the two companies’ securities through
December 31, 2009. 29 This was to be done only by mutual agreement between the
relevant GSE and the Secretary of the Treasury. 30 In order to purchase obligations or
securities of the companies, an emergency determination must be made by the Secretary
of the Treasury. 31 This determination must address whether such actions are necessary to
(i) provide stability to the financial markets, (ii) prevent disruptions in the availability of
mortgage finance and (iii) protect the taxpayer. 32
HERA further states
To protect the taxpayers, the Secretary of the Treasury shall take into
consideration the following in connection with exercising the authority contained
in this paragraph:
(i) The need for preferences or priorities regarding payments to the Government.
(ii) Limits on maturity or disposition of obligations or securities to be purchased.
(iii) The Corporation's [Fannie or Freddie] plan for the orderly resumption of
private market funding or capital market access.
(iv) The probability of the Corporation fulfilling the terms of any such obligation
or other security, including repayment.
(v) The need to maintain the Corporation's status as a private shareholder-owned
company.
(vi) Restrictions on the use of Corporation resources, including limitations on the
payment of dividends and executive compensation and any such other terms and
conditions as appropriate for those purposes. 33
Housing Trust Fund. HERA also established the Housing Trust Fund (“HTF”),
which sought to increase rental and homeownership for extremely low- and very lowincome families. 34 The Act required that Fannie and Freddie “set aside an amount equal
to 4.2 basis points for each dollar of the unpaid principal balance of its total new business
purchases” to support affordable housing initiatives. 35 When the Act was passed, it was
understood that this set-aside would raise at least $500 million each year for such
27

See id. § 4617(a)(4)(A)(i)-(ii).
Fannie Mae, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2012), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/ir/pdf/quarterlyannual-results/2012/10k_2012.pdf. See also 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(2) (2008).
29
See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, supra note 9, § 1117.
30
See id.
31
See id.
32
See id. (amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 1719, 1455 (2010).
33
12 U.S.C. § 1455(l)(1)(C) (2010).
34
See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, supra note 9, § 1338(a)(1).
35
12 U.S.C. §4567(a)(1)(A) (2008).
28
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initiatives. 36 The FHFA suspended these payments as soon as the two companies entered
conservatorship. 37 In fact, no monies have been deposited into the fund.
II. The Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements 38
The Department of the Treasury purchased 1 million shares of so-called
Government Preferred Stock from each company pursuant to the Preferred Stock
Purchase Agreements (“PSPAs”) executed on September 26, 2008. 39 In exchange, the
PSPAs allowed each company to draw up to $100 billion from the Treasury to ensure that
they maintained a net worth of at least zero. The PSPA and the conservatorships were
part of a plan to stabilize the two companies 40 and make good on the implied guarantee
the Companies had been benefiting from for so long. 41
The Government Preferred Stock for each company has a liquidation preference
equal to $1 billion plus the sum of all draws by each company against the Treasury’s
funding commitment. The PSPAs also grant the Treasury warrants to purchase up to
79.9% of each company’s common stock at a nominal price. Owners of preferred stock
thus found themselves as holders of Junior Preferred Stock, to the Government’s Senior
Preferred Stock. 42 The PSPAs also called for a dividend rate for the Treasury of ten
percent of the liquidation preference. 43 The liquidation preference is the amount that each
company “has drawn from the Treasury each quarter to keep its liabilities from exceeding
its assets, plus the initial $1 billion commitment fee” for each company. 44 The two
companies had trouble making these payments for the first couple of years that the
36.

See David M. Herszenhorn, Approval Is Near for Bill To Help U.S. Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2008, at A1 (estimating
$500–$900 million).
37.
Letter from James B. Lockhart III, FHFA Director, to Herbert M. Allison Jr., Fannie Mae CEO, dated Nov. 13, 2008; Letter from
James B. Lockhart III, FHFA Director, to David M. Moffett, Freddie Mac CEO, dated Nov. 13, 2008.
38
The original Agreement and Amendments can be found at http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=364 (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
39
Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement (Sept. 26, 2008),
http://www.fhfa.webfiles/23900seniorpreferredfrea.pdf.
40
See Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial
Markets and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1129.aspx (“Since
this difficult period for the GSEs began, I have clearly stated three critical objectives: providing stability to financial markets,
supporting the availability of mortgage finance, and protecting taxpayers – both by minimizing the near term costs to the taxpayer and
by setting policymakers on a course to resolve the systemic risk created by the inherent conflict in the GSE structure.”);
see also, FHFA, Report to Congress— 2012 (June 13, 2013) at iv, available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/25320/FHFA2012_AnnualReport.pdf.
41
See Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial
Markets and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1129.aspx (“These
Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements were made necessary by the ambiguities in the GSE Congressional charters, which have been
perceived to indicate government support for agency debt and guaranteed MBS. Our nation has tolerated these ambiguities for too
long, and as a result GSE debt and MBS are held by central banks and investors throughout the United States and around the world
who believe them to be virtually risk-free. Because the U.S. Government created these ambiguities, we have a responsibility to both
avert and ultimately address the systemic risk now posed by the scale and breadth of the holdings of GSE debt and MBS.”)
42
Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements, available at http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=364 (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
43
This rate could be increased to 12% under certain circumstances. See Third Amendment to Amended and Restated Senior Preferred
Stock Purchase Agreement para. 3 (Aug. 17, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Documents/Fannie.Mae.Amendement.pdf.
44
The 2012 Amendments significantly altered the structure of the dividend payment, such that the Enterprises are no longer required
to draw funds from Treasury just to pay Treasury dividends. As of January 1, 2013, the dividend payment is no longer based on a
fixed percentage of the liquidation preference. Instead, the dividend is based on the amount of positive net worth reported by each
Enterprise. Net worth is the amount by which assets exceed liabilities. For 2013, each Enterprise must pay the Treasury the amount
of its positive net worth over $3 billion. As discussed above, this $3 billion buffer will gradually decline—by $600 million per year—
until it disappears in 2018. FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ANALYSIS OF THE 2012 AMENDMENTS TO THE
SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENTS, WPR-2013-002, 11-12 (Mar. 20, 2013), available at
http://fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/WPR-2013-002_2.pdf.
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PSPAs were in effect, thereby requiring them to borrow additional funds from the
Treasury in order to pay the dividends as they became due. 45
Pursuant to the PSPAs, Fannie and Freddie were required to make certain
covenants including that, “[w]ithout the prior consent of the Treasury, the GSEs shall
not… [m]ake any payment to purchase or redeem its capital stock, or pay any dividends,
including preferred dividends (other than dividends on the senior preferred stock).” 46
The first two amendments to the PSPSAs increased the ability of the two
companies to borrow from the federal government. The First Amendment, executed on
May 6, 2009, increased the Treasury’s funding commitment to each of Fannie and
Freddie from $100 to $200 billion.47 The PSPA was amended again on December 24,
2009, one week before the Treasury’s temporary authority under HERA expired. This
Second Amendment again increased the Treasury’s funding commitment. But rather than
raising the maximum to a set number, the Second Amendment established a formula to
allow the Treasury’s total commitment to each company to exceed $200 billion
depending upon certain factors. 48
There is much speculation as to why the Treasury structured the conservatorships
in the way that it did. Plausible hypotheses include (1) that the Treasury did not want to
signal that these were complete nationalizations of the two companies to foreign and
domestic investors in Fannie and Freddie securities; (2) that the Treasury did not want to
spur further fear among investors and the public more generally by implementing a
wholesale takeover of the two companies; and (3) that the federal government did not
want to have to consolidate the massive liabilities of Fannie and Freddie into its own
budget, thereby triggering a political firestorm and various legal requirements that pertain
to the federal budgetary process. 49
Whatever the reason, the federal government did not wipe out the junior preferred
shares at the outset of their conservatorships. In a 2008 statement then-Treasury
Secretary Paulson explained that “conservatorship does not eliminate the outstanding
preferred stock, but does place preferred shareholders second, after the common
shareholders, in absorbing losses,” and he also noted that “[p]olicymakers must view this
next period as a ‘time out’ where we have stabilized the GSEs while we decide their
future role and structure.” 50 Then-FHFA Director James B. Lockhart stated, “FHFA will
act as the conservator to operate [Fannie and Freddie] until they are stabilized,” 51 all the
45

See, e.g., Nick Timiraos, Fannie Mae Needs $8.4 Billion More, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703880304575236030191182938?KEYWORDS=fannie+dividend.
46
U.S. Treasury DEP’T Office of PUB. Affairs, Fact Sheet: Treasury Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement (Sept. 7, 2008)
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/310522/000095013308003096/w67133exv99w3.htm.
47
Amendment to Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement (May 6, 2009), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/23892/FannieMae509Amendment.pdf (Treasury and FHFA amend the PSPA for the purpose of
increasing “the maximum aggregate amount permitted to be provided” to $200,000,000.).
48
See Second Amendment to Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement (Dec. 24, 2009), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/23899/FanniesecondAmendment.pdf (“[I]n no event shall the aggregate amount funded under the
Commitment exceed the greater of (a) $200,000,000 (two hundred billion dollars), or (b) $200,000,000 plus the cumulative total of
Deficiency Amounts determined for calendar quarters in calendar years 2010, 2011, 2012, less any Surplus Amount determined as of
December 31, 2012. The liquidation preference of Senior Preferred Stock shall increase in connection with draws on the Commitment,
as set forth in Section 3.3…).”
49
See, e.g., Holman W. Jenkins, Wall Street's Romance With Fan & Fred, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2013, available at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304017204579228123208520160?mod=ITP_opinion_0.
50
WSJ Staff, Officials’ Statements on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2008, 11:51 AM, available at
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2008/09/07/officials-statements-on-fannie-mae-and-freddie-mac/.
51
Statement of James B. Lockhart, Director, FHFA at 6 (Sept. 7, 2008) available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/23/FHFAStatement9708final.pdf.

6

DRAFT Journal of Law & Business (forthcoming 2014) DRAFT

while, emphasizing the temporary nature of the conservatorship. 52 Lockhart made clear
that “in order to conserve over $2 billion in capital every year, the common stock and
preferred stock dividends will be eliminated, but the common and all preferred stocks
will continue to remain outstanding.” 53 Indeed, even through 2012, the FHFA was
discussing the temporary nature of the conservatorship 54 and the role of the FHFA in
trying to bring the Entities to “sound financial condition.” 55
While the conservatorship was entered into with the understanding that the
companies would likely not resurface in the pre-conservatorship structure or even as a
“shareholder-owned company,” there was at least some evidence that the junior preferred
shares could have some value. 56 This type of evidence might have been particularly
compelling for preferred shareholders like Perry Capital which claims to have purchased
many of its shares more than a year after the temporary authority of the Treasury to
purchase Fannie and Freddie’s securities had expired. 57 And so, it remained unclear for
quite some time whether the equity owners would be wiped out by the events that led to
the conservatorship in the first place.
Much of the litigation discussed below will address the explicit agreement
contained in the documents that pertain to the preferred shares as well as duties that the
company has to the preferred shareholders. The legal rights of the junior preferred
shareholders are not clear cut, particularly because the relative rights of preferred
stockholders may be contained in various documents. Looking at a sample Summary of
Offering of Fannie preferred stock that is available on its website, one can see that the
offering documents themselves offer a fair amount of additional wiggle room for the
government:
Holders of Preferred Stock will be entitled to receive non-cumulative, quarterly cash
dividends when, as and if declared by the Board of Directors. . . . Upon on any
dissolution, liquidation or winding up of the Corporation, record holders of the
outstanding shares of Preferred Stock will be entitled to receive, out of the assets of the
Corporation available for distribution to stockholders, before any payment or distribution
is made on the common stock (or any other junior stock) of the Corporation, [a certain
amount per share] . . . (but without accumulation of any dividends for prior dividend
periods). 58

52
“Upon the Director’s determination that the Conservator’s plan to restore the [Companies] to a safe and solvent condition has been
completed successfully, the Director will issue an order terminating the conservatorship.” FHFA Fact Sheet, Questions and Answers
on Conservatorship, available athttp://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/35/FHFACONSERVQA.pdf.
53
See Statement of James B. Lockhart, Director, FHFA (Sept. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/23/FHFAStatement9708final.pdf.
54
FHFA, Report to Congress— 2012, supra note 37, at iv (“The Enterprises cannot remain in conservatorship permanently, and
expanding private sector participation is essential for the long-term health of the mortgage market.”).
55 “The conservatorships of the Enterprises, combined with Treasury’s financial support, has stabilized the Enterprises but not
restored them to a sound financial condition. The Enterprises remain exposed to credit, counterparty, and operational risks.” Id.
56
FED. NAT’L MORTG. ASS’N ANN. REP. at 13-4 (2008), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/ir/pdf/proxystatements/form10k_022609.pdf (“We do not know when or how the conservatorship will be terminated or what changes to our
business structure will be made during or following the termination of the conservatorship. We do not know whether we will exist in
the same or a similar form or continue to conduct our business as we did before the conservatorship, or whether the conservatorship
will end in receivership. We can give no assurance that we will remain a shareholder-owned company. At the time we were placed
into conservatorship, the then Secretary of the Treasury indicated that there is a consensus that we and Freddie Mac pose a systemic
risk and that we cannot continue in our current form.”) (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
57
Press Release, Gibson Dunn, Fannie, Freddie Investors File Suit Challenging U.S. Treasury’s 2012 “Sweep Amendment” (July 7,
2013), http://images.politico.com/global/2013/07/07/treasury_suit_announcement.html.
58
Offering Circular (Aug. 20, 1998), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/ir/pdf/stock-info/seriesd.pdf.
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On June 20, 2011, the Federal Register published the FHFA’s final rule “to
establish procedures for conservatorship and receivership and priorities of claims for
contract parties and other claimants… .” 59 The final rule contained several provisions
that address whether and to what extent claims against the regulated entities by current or
former holders of their equity interests for rescission or damages arising from the
purchase, sale, or retention of such equity interests will be paid while those entities are in
conservatorship or receivership. 60
In retrospect, the rule seems to serve as a preemptive strike against the allegations
contained in the 2013 litigation. It attempts to shield the FHFA with a defense that the
statutory requirements protect it from paying any damages to investors: “The potential
impact of such claims may be significant and may jeopardize FHFA’s ability to fulfill its
statutory mission to restore soundness and solvency….” 61 It continues:
The rule clarifies that for the purposes of priority determinations, claims arising
from rescission of a purchase or sale of an equity security of a regulated entity, or
for damages arising from the purchase, sale, or retention of such a security, will
be treated as would the underlying security that establishes the right to the claim.
The rule also classifies a payment of these types of claims as a capital
distribution, which is prohibited during the conservatorship, absent the express
approval of the Director. 62
This rule appears to provide an additional regulatory basis to ban payments of dividends
to the companies’ shareholders. It remains to be seen whether courts will indeed treat
shareholder claims as prohibited capital distributions by another name.
In a 2012 press release, the Treasury announced the Third Amendment
modifications to the PSPAs, going so far as to label their actions as “steps to expedite
[the] wind down of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.” 63 Such language resonates more with
a receivership than a conservatorship. The FHFA 2012 Report to Congress made it clear
that after the Third Amendment’s enactment, the Companies would not be building
capital reserves. 64 The Third Amendment changed the structure of the dividend
payments the companies were obligated to make to the Treasury. The dividend was no
longer based on a fixed 10% of the liquidation preference, but instead is now based on
the net worth of the companies.
According to the Treasury’s press release, “every dollar of earnings that Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac generate will be used to benefit taxpayers.” 65 This was to be
achieved by replacing the 10% dividend with a 100% quarterly payment of the

59

FHFA 12 C.F.R. pts. 1229 & 1237 (2011), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/21592/Conservatorship_and_Receivership_Final_Rule-signed.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Department Announces Further Steps to Expedite Wind Down of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac (Aug.17, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1684.aspx.
64
FHFA, Report to Congress— 2012, supra note 37, at iii (“Given that the Enterprises have depleted all of their shareholders’ equity,
are operating with financial support from the Treasury, and are not able to retain their earnings, when considering safety and
soundness, it is important to consider the risks associated with the Enterprises’ operations since being placed into conservatorship.”).
65
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 60.
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companies’ net worth. 66 This has become known as the “Net Worth Sweep.” 67 At the
same time, those payments made to the Treasury will have no effect on the value of the
government preferred stock, which will remain $189 billion. Additionally, the companies
“will be wound down and will not be allowed to retain profits, rebuild capital, and return
to the market in their prior form.” 68 Then-Acting FHFA Director DeMarco appeared to
agree with this outlook, indicating that “[t]here seems to be broad consensus that Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac will not return to their previous corporate forms. The Obama
Administration has since made clear that its preferred course of action is to wind down
the Enterprises.” 69
III. The Litigation
At least nineteen cases have been filed by investors arising out of the placement
of Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship. 70 The cases are in the most preliminary of
stages, with case management orders having been issued as well as some preliminary
motions. Ten cases have been filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia alleging a variety of causes of actions, including violations of the
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.
These ten cases have been consolidated into one proceeding. 71 Eight cases have been
filed in the United States Court of Claims, many by the same plaintiffs in the District
Court proceedings. 72 These cases have been assigned to the same judge. These cases
allege that the federal government is liable pursuant to the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Finally, one case alleging violations of HERA
relating to the housing trust fund has been filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida. 73
While these cases concern the same set of facts, they vary in a variety of ways.
Some seek to effectively invalidate the Third Amendment. Others seek damages for
harm allegedly caused to shareholders by the Third Amendment. Some of the cases allege
claims of individual plaintiffs, putative classes, and shareholders by means of derivative
actions. The plaintiffs are also quite varied. Some are preferred or common shareholders
66

Third Amendment to Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement, supra note 40 (modifying dividend rate
of senior preferred stock). Id. at para. 3 (modifying dividend rate of senior preferred stock).
This Net Worth Sweep excludes a relatively small capital reserve amount.
68
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 60.
69
Statement of Edward J. DeMarco, Acting Director, FHFA (Apr. 18. 2013) available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/25114/DeMarcoSenateBankingTestimony41813.pdf
70
This overview of litigation is informed by a presentation by Jerry Stouck of Greenberg Traurig (Nov. 21, 2013).
71
These ten cases were filed in the second half of 2013. The cases are Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-cv-1025 (D.D.C. July 7,
2013); Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. FHFA, No. 13-cv-1053 (D.D.C. July 10, 2013); Liao v. Lew, No. 13-cv-1094 (D.D.C. July 16, 2013);
Cacciapelle v. FNMA, No 1:13-cv-1149 (D.D.C. July 29, 2013); Am. European Ins. Co. v. FNMA, No. 13-cv-1169 (D.D.C. July 30,
2013); Cane v. FHFA, No. 13-cv-1184 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2013); Dennis v. FHFA, No 13-cv-1208 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2013); Marneu
Holdings Co. v. FHFA, No 13-cv-1421 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2013); Arrowood Indemnity Co. v. FNMA, No 13-cv-1439 (D.D.C. Sept.
20, 2013); Borodkin v. FNMA, No 13-cv-1443 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2013). Preliminary Case Management Order No. 1 in The Fannie
Mae/Freddie Mac Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement Litigations, Case No. 13-cv-1025 (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 2013) (Wilkins, J.),
available at http://www.restorefanniemae.us/calendar.
72
These eight cases were also filed in the second half of 2013. They are Washington Federal, v. United States, No. 13-385 (S.D. Fla.
June 10, 2013); Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, No. 13-465 (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2013); Cacciapelle v. United States, No. 13-466
(S.D. Fla. July 10, 2013); Am. European Ins. Co. v. United States, No. 13-496; (S.D. Fla. July 19, 2013) Dennis v. United States, No.
13-542; Fisher v. United States, No. 13-608 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 26, 2013); Shipmon v. FNMA, No. 13-672 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2013);
Arrowood Indemnity Co. v. United States, No. 13-698 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2013), available at
http://www.restorefanniemae.us/calendar.
73
Samuels et al. v. Federal Housing Finance Agency et al., No. 1:13-cv-22399 (S. D. Fla. July 9, 2013).
67
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before or after the Third Amendment was executed. All of the permutations of plaintiffs
cannot be listed here. The defendants are also varied, including the Federal Housing
Finance Agency, as conservator for Fannie and Freddie; the United States Department of
the Treasury as the holder of the Senior Preferred Shares; Fannie and Freddie themselves;
and the United States.
The District Court for the District of Columbia cases seek to enjoin the
enforcement or invalidate the Third Amendment. The plaintiffs argue that, for the
purposes of the Administrative Procedures Act, the government acted arbitrarily,
capriciously or in violation of law. The main claims are that (i) the Third Amendment
created a new security, which the Treasury was not authorized to acquire after January
31, 2009 pursuant to HERA, and (ii) the Third Amendment does not “conserve” the
assets and business of the two GSEs, which violates the FHFA’s duties as conservator of
the two companies. Some cases seek monetary compensation, alleging that the Third
Amendment impaired the preferred and common stock of the two companies. Others
seek monetary damages for a Taking without just compensation. And some seek
damages for various breaches of contract and fiduciary duties.
Suing the federal government is typically harder than suing private parties. The
government has sovereign immunity unless it is waived. And HERA itself gave the
FHFA particular defenses, similar to those of the FDIC under FIRREA. The APA
claims, which are available for challenging “agency action,” are not available if a
particular statute such as HERA precludes judicial review. As noted above, HERA states
that the FHFA shall, “as a conservator or receiver, . . . succeed to . . . all rights, titles,
powers and privileges of . . . any stockholder” of Fannie and Freddie. 74 Again, as
previously noted, HERA states that except “at the request of [FHFA], no court may take
any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of [FHFA] as
conservator or receiver.” 75 It is unclear how this language might apply to the Third
Amendment, but it certainly may be read to give the government broad authority to
address the financial situation of the two companies.
The allegations in the complaints should be read against this backdrop. More
specifically, the main allegations in the complaints against the defendants include the
following.
Treasury. The Treasury’s conduct exceeded its temporary statutory
authority “to purchase securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.” 76 The
Treasury acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to take required
considerations into account. 77
FHFA. The FHFA acted arbitrarily and capriciously 78 in failing to act
consistently with “its statutory duties as conservator” 79 when it agreed to the
74

12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
12 U.S.C. § 4617(f) (2012).
Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, at *8 (D.D.C. July 7, 2013) (referencing 12
USC §§ 1455(l)(4), 1719(g)(4); see also Fairholme Funds, Inc., No. 13-cv-1053.
77
Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Perry Capital LLC, at *8 (citing 12 USC §§ 1455, 1719(g)(1)(B); see
also Fairholme Funds, Inc., No. 13-cv-1053.
78
Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Perry Capital LLC, at *8; see also Fairholme Funds, Inc., No. 13-cv1053.
75
76
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Third Amendment, which prohibits the Companies from building capital. The
FHFA’s conduct exceeded its statutory authority. 80 The particular allegations are
that the APA limits FHFA’s authority; the FHFA’s action as conservator are
limited by statute; 81 and the FHFA, as conservator, “lacked the authority to
initiate a wind down” 82 of the two companies. A further allegation is that even if
the FHFA was acting as receiver, it failed to follow specific applicable procedures
that would apply in that context. 83
The FHFA is liable for breach of contract. 84 That is, preferred
shareholders had contractual rights to specified, non-cumulative dividends and
liquidation preference and, as conservator, the FHFA breached its obligation by
nullifying these contractual rights.
The FHA breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 85
The FHFA breached its fiduciary duty as conservator. 86 That is, because
the FHFA assumed a fiduciary duty and a duty of loyalty to shareholders, entering
into the Net Worth Sweep is a manifest conflict of interest, one that constituted
self-dealing, was intrinsically unfair, was a gross abuse of discretion, and did not
further any valid business purpose or reasonable business objective of Fannie and
Freddie.
And finally, the FHFA failed to finance the Housing Trust Fund. 87
Pursuant to HERA, the FHFA Director could temporarily suspend payments to
Housing Trust Fund under certain circumstances. 88 FHFA suspended payments
79
Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Perry Capital LLC, at *10; see also Fairholme Funds, Inc., No. 13-cv1053, at *31.
80
Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Perry Capital LLC, at *8; see also Fairholme Funds, Inc., No. 13-cv1053.
81
Powers as conservator include returning the entity into “sound and solvent condition” and to “preserve and conserve the assets and
property” of the entity. 12 U.S.C. § 4617 (b)(2)(D) (2012).
82
Perry Capital, LLC. v Lew, No. 1:13-cv-1025 , at *9.
83
Authority of receiver to determine claims.
(A) In general. The Agency may, as receiver, determine claims in accordance with the requirements of this subsection and
any regulations prescribed under paragraph (4).
(B) Notice requirements. The receiver, in any case involving the liquidation or winding up of the affairs of a closed
regulated entity, shall-(i) promptly publish a notice to the creditors of the regulated entity to present their claims, together with proof, to the
receiver by a date specified in the notice which shall be not less than 90 days after the date of publication of such notice; and
(ii) republish such notice approximately 1 month and 2 months, respectively, after the date of publication under clause (i).
12 USCS § 4617(b)(3)(B)(i) (2012).
84
Fairholme Funds, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-01053, at *3, 8; Dennis v Federal Hous. Fin. Agency, No. 1:13-cv-01208, at *32-33 (D.D.C.
Aug. 5, 2013) (Bloomberg); Cacciapelle v. Federal Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 1:13-cv-01149, at *1-7 (D.D.C. Jul. 29, 2013)
(Bloomberg).
85
Id.
86
Fairholme, No. 1:13-cv-01053, at *3, 8; Dennis, No. 1:13-cv-01208, at *32-33
87
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Samuels v Federal Hous. Fin. Agency, No. 1:13-cv-22399-MGC, at para. 54 (S.D.
Fla. July, 9, 2013) (Bloomberg).
88
(b) SUSPENSION OF CONTRIBUTIONS.—The Director shall temporarily suspend allocations under subsection (a) by an
enterprise upon a finding by the Director that such allocations—
“(1) are contributing, or would contribute, to the financial instability of the enterprise;
“(2) are causing, or would cause, the enterprise to be classified as undercapitalized; or
“(3) are preventing, or would prevent, the enterprise from successfully completing a capital restoration plan under section 1369C.
HOUSING AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT OF 2008, 12 U.S.C.A. § 4567(b) (2008) .

11

DRAFT Journal of Law & Business (forthcoming 2014) DRAFT

in the fall of 2008 and refused to review their suspension. 89 In 2012, the
Companies returned to profitability, amounting to more than $17 billion between
the two. 90 Additionally, the Third Amendment had no impact on the amount due
to the fund “since the mandatory payments to the Housing Trust Fund would be
made prior to the calculation of the dividend paid to the U.S. Treasury.” 91
The United States. Shareholders are owed just compensation under the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 92 for
the taking of the value of their stock. 93
IV. Preliminary Thoughts on the Litigation
Given that the litigation is all in such early stages, without any substantive rulings
from the courts, I can only make the most preliminary of judgments as to how the cases
themselves will be decided. Let me start with a gut check on the equities at issue in the
case. As Theodore Olson has argued in the complaint he drafted on behalf of Perry
Capital and in a Wall Street Journal op-ed, there is more than a whiff of strong-arming by
the federal government. 94 The holders of the Junior Preferred Stock — particularly the
holders that predate conservatorship — look like they are receiving a raw deal from the
federal government. As noted above, federal law encouraged some banks to hold GSE
preferred stock over other investments. Such a regulatory regime seemed to imply that
the federal government was guaranteeing performance of the GSEs to some extent. This
gut check does not have the same impact, of course, for investors who purchased
preferred stock after 2008, when the government’s message was much less sanguine.
Some of the complaints go a step further and state that the companies were not “likely to
incur losses that would deplete all or substantially all of” their capital. 95 Having lived
through this history myself and having read the “first draft” of history carefully in the
pages of the NEW YORK TIMES, the WALL STREET JOURNAL and many trade periodicals, I
am somewhat taken aback by this revisionist history.
89
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Samuels v Federal Hous. Fin. Agency, No. 1:13-cv-22399-MGC, at para. 54 (S.D.
Fla. July, 9, 2013) (Bloomberg).
90
Id. at para. 55.
91
Id. After several requests, including an appeal on “Defendants’ refusal to respond, FHFA provided two letters dated November 13,
2008 instructing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to suspend allocations pursuant to Section 1337 of the Federal Housing Enterprises
Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, as amended. The letters state that the suspension was based on findings that (a) the
amount of the contribution would further contribute to the financial instability of the Enterprises; and (b) while FHFA has suspended
capital classifications, it was anticipated that the Enterprises would be required to draw funds from the US Treasury to maintain a
positive net worth. Id. at para. 56, 59.
92
Class Action Complaint, Am. European Ins. Co. v. United States, No. 1:13-cv-00496-MMS (Fed. Cl. July 19, 2013);
Complaint, Fairholme Funds, Inc., v. United States, No. 13-465C (Fed. Cl. July 9, 2013);
Complaint, Washington Federal v. United States, No. 1:13-cv-00385 (Fed. Cl. June 10, 2013).
93
“Before being placed into conservatorship, both Fannie and Freddie had issued several series of Preferred Stock. Holders of
Preferred Stock are contractually entitled to non-cumulative dividends when declared by the Companies and are so contractually
entitled to a liquidation preference should the Companies liquidate.” Complaint, Fairholme Funds, Inc., No. 13-465C, at para 33.
“In sum, ‘every dollar of earnings each firm generates” is now being expropriated by the government on a quarterly basis. This
guarantees that there can never be a distribution to the holders of Preferred Stock no matter how much income the Companies earn
and no matter how much their assets are worth in any liquidation. That is, the preferred shareholders’ stake in the Companies has
been taken, in quarterly installments, since the moment the Net Worth Sweep took effect, and this taking of the preferred
shareholders’ property will continue until the last dime has been extracted from the Companies if and when they are wound up.”
Id. at para. 70.
94
See Theodore B. Olson, Treasury's Fannie Mae Heist, WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2013, 7:22 PM), available at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323309404578617451897504308.
95
See e.g., Complaint, Washington Federal v. United States, No. 1:13-cv-00385, at para. 125 (Fed. Cl. June 10, 2013).
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For those of us who believe that the federal government saved Fannie and
Freddie, two heavily regulated companies, from certain financial ruin in 2008, there is
different narrative. Indeed, one might label the plaintiffs’ narratives as variants of the
“Have Your Cake and Eat It Too” storyline: not only should you have rescued us, but
now you should give us back a big chunk of the stabilized companies at a fire sale price.
One can well imagine how the government will describe the same events in its inevitable
motions to dismiss:
Fannie and Freddie were at the brink of ruin. We swept in, provided unlimited
capital and rescued the companies, the housing market, the country and the world
from the Second Great Depression. To have the plaintiffs engage in Monday
morning quarterbacking and focus on the details from the crisis response that
harmed them, to have them ignore the competing concerns that were at stake for
each of these critical decisions, adds insult to these injurious lawsuits. Judge, do
not succumb to this hindsight bias!
These competing narratives raise a bigger, more interesting question than just the
fate of Fannie and Freddie: What role should these types of lawsuits play after a major
crisis has passed? Some would say that they are an outrage — second-guessing what our
leaders did to avert financial ruin. Others might say that this is an efficient way to
respond to crises: allow the government to do what it needs to do during the crisis, but
use litigation to make an accounting to all of the stakeholders once the situation has
stabilized. I do not have a fully thought out view on this, but I am struck by the dangers
of each approach. The first allows for various kinds of scapegoating (as Hank Greenberg
argues in the AIG bailout litigation) while the second allows for the kind of revisionism
that favors the wealthy and powerful (as with these Takings suits by powerful investors
who bought Fannie and Freddie preferred shares on the cheap as a sort of long shot bet on
what the two companies will look like going forward). It is tough to choose between the
two. 96

96

MAURICE R. GREENBERG & LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, THE AIG STORY HARDCOVER (2013).
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